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Abstract: This paper has a two-part structure. The first part of the paper explores 
contemporary land grabs and shows how they both reflect and constitute a new neo-
liberal governance structure over land and land-based resources. In this sense what is 
noteworthy about land grabs is their world-making capacity: the deals structure and make 
possible new relations of power in the global food economy. For this very reason it is 
crucial to understand how land grabs affect both the pace and direction of agrarian change. 
The second part of the paper examines the discursive strategies that align ‘food security’ 
concerns with land grabbing practices. Here I suggest that ‘food security’ supplies a 
moral sanction for land grabs. By mustering public empathy around a desire to ‘feed the 
future’, food security discourse – to borrow an idea from Fassin (2012) – converts a 
relationship of dominance (the governance of precarious lives) into a relationship of 
assistance (the provision of a remedy). 
 
 
How to make a land grab 
In a recent paper on land grabbing Saskia Sassen (2013, 27 my emphasis) suggests that 
the primary analytical challenge is to ‘recover the work of acquiring large amounts of land 
in a foreign country.’ By ‘work’ Sassen means the socio-political, economic and cultural 
practices that make land deals both possible and justifiable. To uncover this ‘work’ 
Sassen suggests (somewhat counter-intuitively) that we need to look beyond the deals 
themselves. Instead of looking at ‘x’ (land grabs) we ought to examine ‘non-x’ (the 
concatenation of rituals and performances that prepare the ground – literally and 
metaphorically – for land deals).  From here we might ask about land grabs: what 
political goals do they serve, what new social practices do they enable, and what sorts of 
narrative devices do they authorise? What, in other words, is their strategic function?  
 
In this paper I build on this idea, but add to the list of background practices that 
make land deals possible a set of discursive tendencies that align ‘food security’ concerns 
with foreign land appropriations. Here I treat ‘food security’ as a knowledge-power 
constellation that authorises policy interventions pursued under the sign of progress and 
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social improvement. Viewed as an epistemological object ‘food security’ does tremendous 
work to make land deals possible; it is constitutive, rather than merely reflective, of the 
social practices that make land grabs happen. 
 
The argument in this paper runs as follows. In the first section I briefly sketch 
what is known about land grabs – the underlying drivers of the process, the main target 
regions, the principal investors, and the scale of acquisitions. Next I try to pinpoint 
exactly what is novel about the present rush to acquire foreign land. In focusing on 
‘novelty’ I want to be clear that I am not eschewing the very obvious historical parallels 
to be drawn. The point here is to recognise the historic specificity of the present and to 
give adequate weight to the array of embryonic social practices that in time may calcify 
into new ‘norms’ and ‘accepted’ patterns of action. Building on this discussion the final 
part of the paper turns to four discursive tactics that underpin land grabs. My argument 
is that these discourses produce a social reality without which land deals simply would 
not be possible. The symbolic power of this ‘food security’ discourse is therefore as 
important as the socio-economic and political dynamics elaborated in the first part of the 
paper.   
 
The new ‘farms race’ 
‘Land grabs’ are here defined as the transfer of the rights to own, use or control land 
through its sale, lease or concession. The International Land Coalition (ILC), an alliance 
of civil society and intergovernmental organisations, further observes that land grabs 
differ from ‘ordinary’ land acquisitions in the following respects: first, they do not entail 
the ‘free, prior and informed consent’ of the dispossessed; second, investors seldom 
conduct impact assessments on the likely social, economic and environmental 
consequences; third, the contracts that seal these deals are either vague or nonbinding; 
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fourth, land deals often go hand-in-hand with violations of human rights, especially the 
rights of women and minority populations; and fifth, most deals are secured without 
democratic participation or independent oversight (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 11, 18). 
 
The scale of the new land deals is equally noteworthy. Counting only acquisitions 
over 200 hectares (note this figure is 10 times the size of an archetypal small farm), and 
only deals transacted on and after the year 2000, the report concluded that 203 million 
hectares of land – an area over 8 times the size of the United Kingdom – has been sold 
or leased to states, commercial farmers, and private investors. Significantly 66% of all 
land grabs are in sub-Saharan Africa, although sizeable acquisitions have also been agreed 
in Latin America, the Ukraine, Southern Russia, Southeast Asia and Australia (HLPE 
2011, 9; Oxfam 2012, 5).  
 
There are many factors driving this significant wave of investment (cf. Cotula, 
Vermeulen et al 2009; FAO 2012; UNCTAD 2013). Certainly food price squeezes and 
urban unrest have played a role (see Figure 1). From 2007 the Gulf States in particular 
faced exorbitant food bills as the cost of importing provisions soared. Foreign land 
acquisitions thus became an exit strategy from import dependency by firstly enabling 
these states to bypass an increasingly volatile global food economy; and secondly, 
ensuring access to future food supplies via the vertical integration of primary production. 
This is the practice that Philip McMichael (2013) helpfully terms ‘agro-security 
mercantilism’. It represents a (re)turn to supra-market mechanisms to ensure stable 
supplies of food, fodder, fiber and fuel. 
 
A second factor is the real and perceived endowment constraints of nation-states. 
The government of China, for example, is presently getting to grips with the enormous 
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challenge of having to feed 22% of the world’s population with only 9% of the planet’s 
arable land (GRAIN 2008, 3). This problem is magnified by the fact that China, and 
indeed other growth economies, are consuming increasing amounts of meat, fish, fruit, 
and dairy products as they adopt the dietary patterns of the affluent West (OECD 2009, 
32). Anxieties over population growth, the ‘protein bomb’, and dwindling resources are 
unleashing new geopolitical forces. In Saudi Arabia diminishing water reserves forced the 
government to abandon its programme for food self-sufficiency. Low stocks of arable 
land in countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have encouraged these states 
to ‘off-shore’ their food production (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 37). In each case, foreign 
land acquisitions are seen as a solution to looming domestic pressures. 
 
Figure 1. The food price squeeze and urban unrest. Source: Lagi M, Bertrand K Z et al 
2011. Reproduced with permission.  
 
While states have a role in facilitating land grabs it is clear that the big player is 
private capital. Here it is important to distinguish between the activities of the agro-food 
firms and financial capital. The former include, for example, Japanese, Indian, and Arab 
companies – the ‘second-tier’ of the food industry – who see land grabs as an 
opportunity to gain parity with more established market leaders. GRAIN (2008, 7), a 
leading Spanish NGO, reports that Japanese firms have bought 12 million hectares of 
overseas farmland for the production of food and fodder crops. Likewise Karuturi 
Global Ltd., a controversial Indian company and erstwhile specialist in cut flowers, 
describes land acquisitions as an opportunity to scale-up and transition their business 
into the booming agricultural sector: ‘We have identified agribusiness as our next prime 
growth domain. We have taken up cultivation in Ethiopia on a mega scale to become a 
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key player in the global agro-products market.’1 For ambitious food firms like Karuturi 
Global, land grabs are about market expansion and horizontal integration. 
 
Financial capital, by contrast, has been lured into land grabbing by a combination 
of the low cost of land, soaring food prices, and massive speculation in bio-fuels. Reeling 
from the financial crash in 2007-08, financiers once again see land and land-based 
resources as a means of shifting their capital to more ‘stable’ commodity sectors (Daniel 
and Aittal 2009, 5; Smaller and Mann 2009, 1). Thorsson Capital, a business 
conglomerate based in the Republic of Panama, assures investors that land is the ultimate 
recessionary hedge:  
 
In the same line as gold, silver, platinum and palladium, land uniquely 
qualifies as a hard asset … Land purchased in today’s market will appreciate 
in the future and will provide the investor with a stable asset to balance the 
more volatile components of the overall portfolio … Unlike stocks and 
shares, buying land means that you are buying something that is tangible, 
that can be physically seen, cared for and potentially developed into 
something of further value.2  
 
Thorsson Capital is not unique. Some of the world’s biggest money managers are 
establishing agricultural hedge funds with large portions of capital set aside to acquire 
global farmland (Kugelman and Levenstein 2013).  
 
                                                        
1 See Karuturi Global Ltd., http://www.karuturi.com/. Accessed 12 September 2013.  
2 See Thorsson Capital. See http://www.thorssoncapital.com/investing-in-land.html. Accessed 27 
February 2012. 
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Finally, the structural transformation of the energy economy to accommodate 
fuel derived from biomass has helped accelerate land grabs. As the world’s largest 
consumer of oil, the USA has set a target of replacing 30% of its fuel needs with agro-
fuels by 2030. A similar EU directive stipulates that 10 per cent of transport fuels must 
be supplied from ‘renewable’ sources by 2020; the expectation is that 80-90% of this 
target will be met from biofuels (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 26).  The targets set by the US 
and EU reflect a wider trend; 40 out of 50 countries consulted in a recent survey had 
already enacted legislation to promote bio-fuels (Smith 2010, 3). The International 
Energy Agency predicts that by 2030 global agro-fuel consumption is set to reach 250 
billion litres of gasoline equivalent per year (IEA 2011, 23). For supply to match demand 
more land needs to be brought into production. ActionAid (2010, 19) calculates that EU 
countries have already ‘secured or requested 5 million hectares of land for industrial 
biofuels in developing countries.’ Data drawn from the Land Matrix paints a similar 
picture: the highest demand for land investments come from agrofuels, comprising 40% 
of the area acquired where the commodity grown is known (Anseeuw, Wily et al 2011, 
24).  
 
Focusing on ‘non-x’ 
From this thumbnail review it should be evident that land grabs mark a point of rupture in 
the management of agricultural resources (for a fuller discussion cf. Nally 2012). To 
specify this rupture more clearly I want to foreground four ways that land deals promote 
a new neo-liberal governance structure over land and land-based resources. 
First, new geopolitical relations and fault lines are being forged around foreign 
land grabs. Today, whether it is Brazil investing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or 
China investing in the Philippines, or indeed North African states investing in sub-
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Saharan Africa, land deals are noticeably skewed along a new South-South geographical 
axis. In short, land grabs enable a new ‘redistribution of power’ (McMichael 2013, 48) in 
the food economy as established sites of influence yield ground to new centres of 
authority and control. Within this new nexus of governance – which is arguably more 
‘networked’ and less ‘hierarchical’ (Duffield 2001, 2) than the traditional North-South 
divide – an ‘extraordinary variety of actors’ interact, including parastatal institutions, 
pension fund managers, commodity traders, strategic consultants, business 
entrepreneurs, as well as NGOs and state agencies (Fairhead, Leach et al 2012, 239). It is 
from these polycentric constellations and ‘particularized assemblages’ (Sassen 2013, 29) 
that land grabs arise. 
 
 Second, as Philip McMichael (2013, 15) argues, land grabs represent ‘a kind “re-
territorialization” [that] is designed to avoid dependence on markets, or more 
particularly, market intermediaries.’ In other words, the kind of horizontal and vertical 
integration that corporations such as Wal-Mart promote is now being pursued in 
agriculture by states (sometimes through public-private partnership) and private capital. 
For these actors market-bypassing strategies are a means to secure supply lines – and, 
just as importantly, circumvent real and perceived endowment constraints. By capturing 
and ‘endogenizing’ (Sassen 2013, 27) global nature states can kickback against both 
national and natural limits to growth.  
Third, the politicisation of land grabs – including the work of civil society 
organisations in shaming foreign investors – has spurred efforts to better regulate 
investments. The FAO, for example, has established Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (VGs), while the World Bank has produced an alternative set of 
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standards known as Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) protocols. Significantly 
these developments suggest that we should accept the reality of land grabs and work 
collectively to mitigate their worst effects. For Olivier de Schutter loose governance 
frameworks of this kind simply finesse the details of land grabs – they suggest that it is 
okay to ‘destroy the peasantry’ so long as one accomplishes this ‘responsibly’ (de 
Schutter, 2011, 275). The overall effect – handing foreign entities the right to use 
national resources (something that was, until recently, forbidden in many countries cf. 
Spieldoch and Murphy 2013) – is hardly interrupted. The promotion of a ‘light’ 
regulatory environment ought to be seen as part a wider politics of liberal governance 
that substitutes ‘codes of conduct’ for the rule of law. This recalibration of governance 
coincides with the deepening loss of economic sovereignty seen most obviously in the 
largesse dispensed by host governments (including tax holidays, exemptions from export 
duties, concessional lending practices, free or cheap use of the commons etc.) attempting 
to lure and retain foreign capital. What investors want – and are arguably winning – is ‘a 
homogenous global playing field around which they can freely move raw materials, labor, 
capital, finished products, tax-paying obligations, and profits’ (Barnes 2006, 21). 
Fourth and finally, the deals signal the deepening penetration of financial markets 
into the food system.  As several scholars have argued, agriculture has long represented a 
barrier or interruption to the circulation of capital (Kloppenburg 2004; Lewontin 2000). 
However, geographer George Henderson (1998, 111) astutely notes: 
 
that while capitalist society, through its agriculture (inter alia), commodifies 
and exploits nature directly, it also exploits the very condition whereby 
nature poses interruptions or “obstacles” to its exploitation. These so-called 
obstacles, which slow the valorization of productive capitals on the farm … 
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open up temporal and spatial channels for the extraction of surpluses by 
means of fictitious values and fictitious capitals. 
 
By exposing natural resources to new forms of exploitation (e.g. turning food into fuel, 
generating speculative bubbles through hedge funds, etc.) land grabs make possible the 
‘assetisation’ of nature – that is, the conversion of global agricultural land into a financial 
instrument –thus speeding up the valorisation process.  As Neil Smith observed, ‘capital 
is no longer content simply to plunder an available nature, but rather increasingly moves 
to produce an inherently social nature as the basis of new sectors of production and 
accumulation’ (cited in Fairhead Leach et al 2012, 243). In short, land grabs prise open 
new ‘temporal and spatial channels’ for the realisation of profit. 
 
 
How to authorise a land grab 
In final part of this paper I want to delineate the legitimating strategies that make land 
grabs possible. To frame this discussion I begin with some remarks by George Orwell 
(2002 ([1946], 963) on the politics of language: 
 
In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the 
indefensible … [V]illages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven 
out into the countryside, and the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire 
with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are 
robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than 
they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. People 
are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent 
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to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable 
elements. 
 
To Orwell’s list of ‘exhausted idioms’ (2002 [1946], 964) one would have to add the term 
‘food security,’ widely used from the mid-1970s to denote strategies to boost food 
supplies and nowadays invoked in debates on everything from famine relief to future 
climate change. In these discussions, ‘food security’ is commonly presented as an 
ideologically neutral concept, a pre-political idea that is moreover a global good. Similar 
to modern humanitarian reason (Fassin 2012, 3) the concept galvanises public empathy 
and in the process it re-narrates a relationship of dominance (the governance of 
precarious lives) as one of assistance (the provision of a remedy). Below I fasten on just 
four strands of contemporary ‘food security’ discourse in order to show how political 
speech is bent to ‘defend the indefensible’. 
 
Closing yield gaps 
The authors of the World Bank’s report on land deals, entitled Rising Global Interest in 
Farmland, claim that much of the agricultural land in the global South, and especially in 
Africa, is ‘unutilized’ and could be targeted for a ‘productivity increase’ via foreign 
investment: ‘None of the African countries of most interest to investors,’ the report 
asserts, ‘is now achieving more than 30% of the potential yield on currently cultivated 
areas’ (Deininger, Byerlee, et al 2011, xiv; Li 2011, 294). To illustrate this point the report 
is peppered with maps and tables that show ‘the maximum potential value’ (Deininger, 
Byerlee, et al 2011, 78; Li 2011, 282) that could be realised on each continent if the land 
was repurposed for intensive commercial farming.  
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The Global Harvest Initiative (GHI), an industry-led advocacy group that 
includes DuPont, Elanco, IBM, John Deere and Monsanto, embraces the same ‘yield 
gap’ arguments. GHI’s annual GAP Report™ includes a GAP Index™ that aims to 
quantify the difference between the present rate of agricultural productivity and the pace 
required to meet future needs. The report is replete with shiny graphics (see Figure 2) 
and ‘hard facts’ that make a convincing case for more large-scale commercial farming. 
The story is also one of tipping points – 2050 and 9 billion people – after which it may 
be too late to mitigate the worst effects of population increases, climate change and 
dwindling resources. If the plough is to rein in the stork (Arnold 1988, 39), so the 
argument goes, we must embrace a new agricultural revolution.  
 
Similarly DuPont’s Advisory Committee on Agricultural Innovation and Productivity 
for the 21st Century assures readers that the company is committed to addressing the ‘food 
productivity gap’ and furthermore counsels that ‘stakeholders remain focused on the 
question of how to adequately raise productivity to meet the world’s food needs, rather 
than get distracted by historic disputes, such as biotechnology versus traditional crop 
breeding, organic farming versus conventional farming, or food versus fuel production’ 
(Dupont Advisory Committee 2011, 5-6). Note that organic agriculture is contrasted with 
‘conventional farming’ by which the committee mean large-scale industrial agriculture. 
Observe too that concerns about biotechnology and using land to ‘grow fuel’ – while 
over 800 million people around the world are undernourished – are dismissed as ‘historic 
disputes.’ The urgency of producing more food to save lives means that almost every other 
concern can be suspended.  
 
 
Figure 2. Visualising the ‘yield gap’. Source: GHI 2010, 5. Reproduced with permission. 
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Strategic consultants and financial analysts have observed the power of the ‘yield 
gap’ argument. According to Susan Payne, founder of Emergent Asset Management Ltd. 
(EAM) a UK investment fund, ‘farmland in sub-Saharan Africa is giving 25% returns a 
year and new technology can treble crop yields in short time frames.’ ‘If we do not pay 
great care and attention now to increase food production by over 50% before 2050,’ 
warns Payne, ‘we will face serious food shortages globally’ (Payne citied in, Vidal  2011, 
np). For Neil Crowder the Chief Executive Officer at Chayton Capital, an investment 
firm with significant monies in Zambia, deals are done with the aim of ‘unlocking the 
potential of agricultural land and assets by optimizing production and operational 
efficiency.’3  
 
These and other ‘yield gap’ claims ignore Amartya Sen’s (1981) classic point that 
food supply arguments do not sufficiently explain the persistence of hunger. Indeed it is 
perfectly possible to experience a subsistence crisis in the context of an overall increase 
in food availability. Such ‘boom time’ famines, Sen argued, are a reminder that ‘food 
scarcity’ is relative rather than an absolute category. Indeed, it is well established that 
enough food exists to feed in excess of the world’s current population (OECD 2009, 21).  
 
The logic of depeasantisation 
In an exemplary article on land grabs, anthropologist Tania Li links the ‘yield gap’ 
argument to the desire to engineer a general ‘exit from agriculture’ in the global South.  
Li cites the World Development Report, entitled Agriculture for Development (2008) and its 
                                                        
3 Crowder cited in, ‘Unlocking sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural potential’ The Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 2 June 2010, http://www.miga.org/news/index.cfm?aid=2652. Accessed 12 September 
2013. 
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recommendation that smallholders unable to compete in the globalised food economy 
should abandon agriculture to more ‘productive users’ and take up wage labour. ‘The 
assumption [is],’ Li goes on to explain, ‘that the nations of the global South will, sooner 
or later, experience an agrarian transition similar to the one that occurred in Europe in 
earlier centuries, characterised by the shift from farm to factory, country to town, and for 
those who stay in the countryside, a transition from subsistence production to high value 
commodity production or wage work on large farms’ (Li 2011, 293; cf Li 2009a; Li 
2009b).  
 
We have, of course, seen processes of alienation and dispossession accelerating 
over the last century. In The Age of Extremes, the final volume in his much-fêted quartet of 
books, historian Eric Hobsbawm declared that the ‘death of the peasantry’ constituted 
‘the most dramatic and far-reaching social change of the second half of this [twentieth] 
century,’ sealing ‘us off forever from the world of the past’ (cited in Weis 2007, 24).  
While many on the left felt that this was a premature obituary, several commentators on 
the right view the peasantry’s demise as a blessing in disguise. According to economist 
Paul Collier, ‘peasant farming is not well suited to innovation and investment’. For him 
the ‘most realistic way’ of drawing down global food prices ‘is to replicate the Brazilian 
model of large, technologically sophisticated agro-companies’ (cited in Pearce 2013, 397). 
Continuing in the pages of Foreign Policy Collier (2008, np) went on to mock ‘the middle- 
and upper class love affair with peasant agriculture’ and the view that ‘peasants, like 
pandas, are to be preserved.’ Given the present food crisis, Collier announced, support 
for small-scale farming reflects a ‘retreat into romanticism.’ In Collier’s view ‘the world 
needs more commercial farms, not less’ (ibid). 
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Collier’s remarks are only the latest instalment in a long history of disparaging 
small farmers.  Victorian elites castigated in equal measure Indian ryot farmers, Irish 
cottier tenants and African sharecroppers as primitive, idle, mendacious and 
improvident. To imperial eyes peasants were symbols of obsolescence, no more capable 
of agricultural improvement than the dodo was capable of flight. And as with the dodo 
their future would be short-lived; extinction was the inevitable and natural dénouement. 
Indeed famines often did the trick (Nally 2011a).  Much the same narrative that 
characterised the colonial period carried over into the Green Revolution, as 
‘depeasantisation’ (Araghi 1995) became the sine qua non for agricultural improvement.  
 
Although today’s promoters of agricultural development often employ 
‘smallholder friendly’ rhetoric – witness a recent report from the World Economic 
Forum’s (2013) New Vision for Agriculture which identified small farmers as ‘change 
agents’ and vital ‘catalysts’ – it is less clear how the planned for ‘partnerships’ between 
giant global operators and low income farmers will work to the mutual advantage of 
both. All too often the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ masks the obvious asymmetries of power 
between brokers and the fact that there are few legally binding guarantees for local 
businesses and small farmers (cf. Nally and Vira 2013).  
 
The sacralisation of markets 
A third plank in the land grabs discourse is the sacralisation of markets. Richard 
Ferguson, head of global agriculture at the investment bank Renaissance Capital, firmly 
believes that ‘A free market with transparent pricing, enforceable property rights and 
liberalized trade would solve just about every agricultural problem under the sun’ (cited in Pearce 
2012, 398, my emphasis).  The UK’s Foresight Report (2011: 168) also states that ‘Food 
security is best served by fair and fully functioning markets and by liberalised global trade 
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arrangements, not by policies to promote self-sufficiency.’ According to GHI (2011, 16) 
‘trade is the mechanism that links supply to demand, and trade liberalization plays an 
essential role in promoting global food security by making the international food system 
more efficient.’ The New Vision for Agriculture promoted by the World Economic Forum 
(2013) also prioritises market-based approaches to food security and poverty reduction. 
As the report rather awkwardly asks: ‘With the models employed, are smallholders able 
fully to participate in the market, or are most still mainly at the subsistence level?’  
 
The implicit contrast between market participation (‘good’) and subsistence 
agriculture (‘bad’) is not, however, a straightforward one. An important report authored 
by the World Food Programme (2009, 25) observed that while food markets help 
‘promote efficiency in resource allocation, especially through the signals they send to 
food producers, who favour high prices … [they] tend to fail most often and most 
severely for those who need them the most – the hungry poor.’  Today’s agricultural 
reformers rarely acknowledge the tendency for markets to tilt against the poor; nor 
should they when their primary aim is to introduce market values at every point in the 
food chain. Nigeria’s Minister for Agriculture, Akinwumi Adesina, summarises the mood 
well: ‘[W]e are restructuring the space for the private sector to add value to every single 
thing.’ ‘[In the past] we were not looking at agriculture through the right lens,’ continues 
Adesina. ‘We were looking at agriculture as a developmental activity, like a social sector 
in which you manage poor people in rural areas. But agriculture is not a social sector. 
Agriculture is a business. Seed is a business, fertiliser is a business, storage, value added, 
logistics and transport – it is all about business’ (Green 2013, np).  If land deals can 
accelerate the transition to marketization, then by this logic they should be vigorously 
pursued. 
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The power of solicitude 
According to Neil Crowder at Chayton Capital, land deals are inspired by a desire to care 
for the stricken and neglected. ‘The important thing to note,’ says Crowder, ‘is that we 
are focusing on investments that will serve the continent’s own growing consumer 
market. Our goal is to feed Africa.’4 A leading industry magazine called Real Deals – 
displayed on the website of Emergent Asset Management – asks ‘can private equity feed 
the world?’ ‘Food shortages represent the biggest threat to global prosperity,’ warns the 
headline, and ‘private equity investors must stop ignoring the investment opportunity of 
a lifetime.’5 Jarch Management Group, an investment house specialising in African land, 
declares: ‘The Company believes in the empowerment of the populations who actually 
own the resources, sometimes being exploited by others. Jarch looks to work with the 
population to develop strategies to secure their political and economic rights of self 
determination’ (see Figure 3).6 
 
For Feronia Inc., a company financing ‘plantations’ in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, land deals promote social improvements: 
 
We provide employment for approximately 4,000 people, and recognize that 
our people are our most valuable asset. We provide education, medical 
services, sanitation and housing for these workers and their families, 
supporting a community of over 45,000. We also provide the community 
infrastructure, including roads and electricity supplies. Feronia operates three 
comprehensive hospital facilities in the DRC – one at each of our 
                                                        
4 Crowder cited in, ‘Unlocking sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural potential’ The Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 2 June 2010, http://www.miga.org/news/index.cfm?aid=2652. Accessed 12 September 
2013 
5 Cited on the website of EAM. See https://www.emergentasset.com/?func=PagePressItem&PressId=6. 
Accessed 12 September 2013 
6 See Jarch Capital http://www.jarchcapital.com/company-overview.php. Accessed 12 September 2013 
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plantations. We are the sole provider of healthcare services in our 
communities, providing medications, vaccinations, and general medical 
services. These services include various surgeries and child-delivery. We 
recognize the children in our communities as being an important hope for 
Africa’s future…’7 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Land grabs as a welfare and ‘empowerment’ strategy. Source: 
http://www.jarchcapital.com.  
 
 
The Indian investment firm Karuturi Global echoes the sentiment that land deals can 
build ‘resilience’ and ensure the vulnerable against risk. The firm’s strategy for ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (CSR) in Ethiopia includes distributing ‘woollen blankets to [the] 
poor and elderly … free food every Sunday to 100 destitutes [and] contributing $75,000 
towards drinking water supply for Holetta town’. 8  This is what I have elsewhere 
described as ‘corporate biopolitics’ (Nally 2011b), whereby public welfare is recodified as 
corporate welfare – and in the process land grabs are restyled as a beneficent gift. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A House of Commons Committee (2009, 23) recently questioned Hilary Benn, the 
former Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the UK, about 
                                                        
7 See Feronia Inc http://feronia.com/Responsibility/Community/default.aspx. Accessed 12 September 
2013 
8 Cited on the website of Karuturi Global Ltd.,  
http://www.karuturi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=112&Itemid=131. Accessed 
Accessed 12 September 2013 
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land grabs. While Benn recognised that the deals could generate problems, overall he 
‘seemed fairly complacent,’ describing the trend as an inexorable ‘a sign of the times’.  In 
contradistinction to Benn’s view, this paper has shown that land grabs are the outcome 
of a complex, and in many cases novel, political processes involving policy assumptions 
and incentive structures that lock communities into violent trajectories of historical 
change and render silent or irrelevant alternative pathways to development. Land grabs 
are made – they are thus part of what Edward Said (1993, 7) termed the ‘struggle over 
geography’ – and so it stands that they can be unmade. 
 
In addition to foregrounding the ‘work’ done to construct global land deals it is 
important to remind ourselves of the enormous costs of global enclosure. It has been 
estimated (Oxfam 2012, 2) that 66% of foreign land deals are in countries facing chronic 
hunger problems. An influential report by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (Cotula, Vermeulen et al 2009, 4) documented 157 approved land deals 
in Ethiopia alone, including a single acquisition of 150,000 hectares of land for livestock 
production. Yet in 2009 7.8 million Ethiopians (10% of the population) were recorded as 
chronically hungry. Ethiopia remains the world largest recipient of food aid – all the 
while the government and investors benefit from a thriving agrarian export sector 
reputed to be worth over $50 million (Oakland Institute 2009, 8-10). Such figures suggest 
that endeavours to realise ‘food security’ may actually generate new forms of precarity (cf. 
Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013), rather than merely being responses to the latter. 
For this very reason abundance and scarcity, security and insecurity, need to be theorised 
and grasped as interdependent phenomenon.  
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